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christoph.antweiler@uni-bonn.de

Abstract
How can we conceive of global culture as an entity without playing unity and diversity off
one another? The diversity of interconnected cultures on a bounded planet requires shared
orientations. Thus, the conceptualization of a cosmopolitan humanism is an urgent project for
humanity. Particularly, it is of urgent necessity that we determine what a version of
cosmopolitan humanism looks like that does not rush to universalize the views and historical
experiences of the European or American world? The need for unity is juxtaposed against the
ubiquitous tendency to differentiate. All are alike, yet all are different, and above all,
everyone wants to distinguish him or herself from an other. People are not content to define
cultures predominantly in terms of their differences, nor do individuals map neatly onto a
single “identity.” A central question in the pursuit of a new and non-Western-centric
humanism goes as follows: What do we owe strangers by virtue of our shared humanness
(Appiah, 2006, p. xxi)? Any realistic cosmopolitanism must proceed from an understanding
of humankind as one entity, without requiring us to re-design cultures to fit some sort of
global template. Answers for an orientation that combines unity and diversity can be gained
by deploying (1) shared biological characteristics of humans as well as (b) commonalities on
the pan-cultural level. A revisit to the topic of human universals is needed.1
Keywords: universals, cosmopolitanism, humanism
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In view of worldwide interaction between members of different cultures, there is an
increasing demand for research that empirically inquires into what constitutes the unity of
humankind. What is at stake is the development of some form of humanism that emphasizes
cross-cultural unity and that which what cultures have in common while not neglecting the
differences among individuals’ identities that are indispensible for the formation of identity.
To this end, and the leading assumption underlying this essay, is the understanding
that concepts of cultural diversity that imply some kind of universal quality will prove to be
most suitable in this effort. The focus on universals is more fruitful than the usual focus on
cultural difference and inter-culturality, both of which tend to posit cultural difference as an
absolute given. Theories of universal qualities are at the same time more realistic than the
denial of any cultural limits, currently en vogue in cultural studies. Figuratively speaking, the
efforts undertaken in this essay and in the examination of universals in general amounts to an
attempt to answer the question of how to visualize the world in its entirety, regarding it less as
a globe (which would emphasize difference) and more as a planet.
Cosmopolitanism is a worldview that sees all humans as belonging to one community.
More specifically, it is about the relation of individuals and localized cultures to humanity as
a whole. The leading question is whether human beings can be conceived as world citizens (or
even citizens of the larger universe, as the ancient Greeks understood the term). A
cosmopolitan perspective on global citizenship is related to assumptions regarding what is
fundamentally human about any person (Josephides & Hall, 2014). Thus, cosmopolitan
reflections often come with normative baggage. As a remedy against this ideological and often
wishful slant of the cosmopolitan perspective, this paper proceeds from the maxim that any
form of cosmopolitanism must consider the conditions of its own feasibility. Some scholars
have mistakenly viewed cosmopolitanism as a Western-centric values project. However, in
my view, cosmopolitanism should be based on empirical studies, with the tools and resources
offered by cultural anthropology, in order to provide insights on commonalities in many or
even all cultures. Scientific insights into pan-cultural phenomena cannot offer shared norms
and values to be globalized; that is the duty of politics. Furthermore, by their very nature,
values have a tendency to be imperialistic (Appiah, 2006, p. 24). By knowing the needs,
orientations, and problems shared by many cultures, we can gain a realistic starting point from
which to create a common orientation. Such knowledge could restrain us from latching on to
the notion of any kind of cosmopolitanistic utopia or undertaking any utopian cosmopolitics.
The use of empirical studies to examine cosmopolitanism may not lead to globally shared
values, but it may help to negotiate rules for the interaction between entangled cultures on
our small planet, rules that are based on empirical realities. Historically, during the
Enlightenment, “Western universals” were invoked and then imposed on various cultures
through power, pressure, and manipulation. Presently, many Western ideas and practices have
been adopted, transformed, altered, and modified within many societies through
“glocalization,” as local regions adopt global culture. This process is sometimes viewed as
“negotiated universals.” These negotiated universals then may be differently legitimized
within different cultures, thus integrating diversity (Antweiler, 2012, pp. 205- 207).
The argument of this article proceeds in six stages. In part 1, I characterize universals as
common human properties on a collective level. The proposition is that universals, though
they differ from the concept of “human nature,” are useful for conceptualizing a realistic
biocultural view of humanity. Part 2 elucidates the comparison between species and between
cultures as being the central targets when researching universals. While synchronic
comparisons and historical comparisons are important, it is also relevant to make comparisons
between various species in order to arrive at an empirically based concept of humanity. This
leads to the causes of universals set out in part 3. What is emphasized here is that our biotic
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equipment constitutes only one factor contributing to the establishment of universals. In part
4, it is argued that cultural theories should not be based entirely on the differences between
(ethnic) cultures, national culture, or civilizations but should instead take into account both
intra-cultural diversity and pan-cultural universals. This section also sets out some universals
in world-views that might be useful for an inclusive humanism. In part 5, it is argued, in
conclusion, that universals provide an empirical access to “humanness,” that they are an
alternative to both extreme cultural relativism and to the absolute given universals stipulated
by some schools of thought.
Pancultural and emerging universals vs. ‘Human Nature’
Notions about universals (e.g., cultural universals, human universals) are generalities
at the level of human collectives. Universals are elements or phenomena to be found regularly
in all or almost all societies known to us (Brown, 1991; Brown, 2013; Antweiler, 2016, ch. 1).
More specifically, these elements are patterns that we come across not only in the present day
but in all cultures, independent of their time and place. By this definition, universals are
understood as mere phenomena (without naming their causes). The reason for this, as is
explained later, is that there are several possible causes that may result in the existence of
universals. Well-known examples of universals that are more commonly postulated are the
Oedipus-complex, the dominance of men in politics and in public life, and incest-avoidance
norms.
-

Anthropomorphic concepts
Nepotism
Specific gender-roles, -states, -ideals
Wedding rites
Categories or terminology to designate age-groups
Contraceptive practices
Magical concepts
The linear concept of time as an arrow (besides other time-concepts)
Ethnicity and ethnocentrism
Practices of weather-forecasts
The concept of romantic love
Music, dances, performances
Art as ‘making special’
Politeness by means of long introductions

Figure 1: Examples of universals (original Antweiler, 2015)
Universals can take on a variety of manifestations: in life in general, in behavior, and
in thinking and feeling, as well as in social institutions and certain objects of material culture.
Fig. 1 gives a few examples of universals in order to demonstrate their multifariousness with
regard to their content and specificity. The examples chosen are only a small selection of
universals either postulated or demonstrated. Various catalogues of universals have been
published subsequent to the first list of 73 universals drawn up by George Peter Murdock in
1945 (see the comparison of such lists in Antweiler, 2016).
One usually differentiates various forms and types of universals that have been
compiled with precise terms and taxonomies in linguistics (e.g. Holenstein, 1979) and
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comparative psychology (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Without dwelling on this point more
extensively (see Antweiler, 2016, ch. 8), I briefly name the most important universals. One
distinguishes absolute or true universals (i.e. features to be found in all known societies) from
near universals (i.e. phenomena encountered in a great number of known societies but not in
all of them). Another group also exists: the so-called implicational universals. These
universals consist of a relationship between two characteristics in such a way that whenever
one specific feature (which itself is not a universal) exists in a society, another related feature
is also to be found (but not vice versa). A simple example of this type of universal is that all
languages that have a plural form also have a dual form.
The universality or ubiquity that lends a phenomenon its status as a universal always
applies to cultural units, e.g. societies, nations, or ethnicities, but not to individuals. Because
universals manifest themselves throughout all cultures, though not necessarily in all
individuals, such universals may also be designated “cultural universals.” These are distinct
from other forms that refer to general human characteristics, i.e. features that are to be found
in all individuals across the species (i.e., in all of humankind). As an example of the
difference between cultural universals and traits of the human species (biotic universals), we
can say that every human being has the capacity to learn (any) language that they are exposed
to as a young child but that every culture (society) has a specific language. Contrary to
common opinion, universals are therefore not to be simply equated with human nature or the
general attributes of Homo sapiens, although they are partially related with these.
cultures # 1, 2, 3 ...

... ca. 5000 – 6700

Future
Future (potential) universals

Current universals
(ethnographic present)

cultural anthropology

universals broadly defined

Earlier (former) universals
comparative history

Past

Figure 2: synchronic and diachronic universals (modified after Antweiler 2012,:99)
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Some authors define universals as phenomena that are not only found in all
contemporary cultures but are a common feature of all known human societies (Fig. 2).
Diachronic universals thereby exist in cultures across time and space. Our ethnographic
knowledge of more recent cultures is rather incomplete. Our knowledge of prehistoric
cultures is also fragmentary. Hence, it will be particularly difficult to define such timeless
universals accurately. This, however, should not prevent us from investigating diachronic
universals since our fragmentary empirical knowledge can be supplemented by other methods
such as deduction or retro-diction. Accordingly, Brown defines human universals as transcultural as well as trans-historical: human universals comprise those “features of culture,
society, language, behavior, and psyche that, so far as the record is clear, are found in all
ethnographically or historically recorded human societies” (Brown, 2013, p. 410, italics
mine). Complementing the search for today’s commonalities is the search for historical
continuities and historical universals in human practice. In light of the wave of global
interconnectedness occurring today, Robbie Robertson has recommended an “inclusive
reading of history” so that our universal endeavors may prove worthwhile (Robertson, 2003).
Cultural universals consist of specific features of certain human collectives but are not
equivalent to the sum total of the features of those collectives. Thus, to claim that societies are
similar with regard to feature A does not preclude the possibility that those societies differ
greatly with respect to features B and C – or even all other features. Examples showing that a
search for universals does not rule out diversity can be found in recent cross-culturally
comparative work e.g. on the socialization of crucial norms (Quinn, 2005) or on conceptions
of friendship (Hruschka, 2010). Some recent works in historical anthropology (Wulf, 2013)
and political philosophy (Jullien, 2014) follow a similar line. The determination of a
universal, therefore, does not diminish the uniqueness of certain objects, persons, or societies.
It simply means that the examined object is not unique in every respect.
Since traits of the human species are also called “universals” in the research literature
(e.g. Kappeler & Silk, 2006), it is important to emphasize that cultural universals have a status
that is different from the characters defining various species of animals. With animals, the
universalizing designation of a species comes very close to the findings one would expect
from an ethogram (an inventory of all typical behaviors) of any population of that species.
This means that one could investigate different populations of a given species, with due
consideration of environmental parameters, and from that investigation, one would derive
generalizing universals about the entire kind. However, this approach is less effective with
more complex species. Indeed, even in the case of some primates, this ethnogramic approach
is only possible within limits, as the differences in behavior among various populations of
free-living chimpanzees and orangutans, for example, have shown (van Schaik et al., 2003;
van Schaik, forthcoming 2016). With human populations, such generalizations are even less
possible. Therefore, the research on universals can count as a specific, empirical contribution
to resolving the problem of determining what it is that constitutes our human nature, a human
nature that would include our inherited disposition toward, capacity for, and need for culture.
The definition of universals as existing across all human societies does not imply that
such characteristics do not also exist among populations of other primates. This needs to be
emphasized since the understanding of some authors of the nature of universals is that these
universals are characteristics exhibited by all human beings but are not to be found among
animals; in fact, when features are exhibited only in one species, such features should be
deemed not universals but rather “species-specific features.” For example, one of the few
features that differentiate humans from other animals, including all other primates, is that of
“secret copulation.” In human populations, it is not only ovulation that is covert, but so is
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sexual intercourse; in all human cultures, intercourse does usually not take place coram
publico but in private (Ehrlich, 2002, p. 187f.)
Specific types of universals espoused by Talcott Parsons are constituted by universals
of development or so-called evolutionary universals. They are of particular relevance within
the framework of a globalized process of development. In the early 1960s, sociologist Parsons
formulated universals or functional requisites of macro-societal development. With his
concept of evolutionary universals, he defines certain inventions of civilizations—including
writing, market economies, bureaucratic organization, common law, and democracy, as well
as increasing social mobility—as the specific achievements of complex societies. In
particular, six evolutionary universals are held to be of great relevance by Parsons: social
stratification, cultural legitimization (e.g., social ideals and social identity), administrative
bureaucracy, monetary systems, generalized and universally applicable norms, and
democratic forms of association (Parsons, 1964; Sanderson, 2007).
Evolutionary universals emerging in large-scale social systems are currently reflected
anew from an approach unrelated to macro-sociology or universal history. Evolutionary
psychologists and ecologists are dealing with the implications of what in a macro-historical
perspective can be regarded as the unusual size of modern human societies. Societies that are
larger and more complex than those that were typical of the Holocene,2 with its small groups
comprising up to about 150 individuals, are designated as ultra-social (Dunbar, 1993;
Campbell, 1983: 12f). Modern human societies, be they ethnic groups or states, are both
demographically and spatially considerably larger than anything known to us from other
primates. Modern societies represent highly complex forms of society or are parts of these. In
addition, most groups of humans dispose of a considerable amount of material objects.
Frequently, these objects are artifacts of a trans-generational durability. On top of this, the
modern era has brought with it intensive, trans-generational and irreversible changes in our
physical environment. Almost everywhere on earth, people live in anthropogenic shaped
landscapes and thereby in environments that are predominantly formed by human activity
(Anthropocene; for cases see Hornidge & Antweiler 2012).
For the larger part of history Homo sapiens lived in small groups. This fact is a major
theme in evolutionary psychology, where, as distinct from sociobiology, in which it is not so
much that the common ground existing between humankind and animals is of interest but that
instead, the special characteristics of human beings are emphasized. Evolutionary
psychologists are focussed on how the human psyche has been shaped by ancestral
environments. The effect on humans of their evolutionary history and environment has farreaching consequences for the understanding of universals. Not only were early human
groups small, but they also used comparatively few artifacts, and they effected few lasting
changes on their physical environments. A special feature of early human society, which
makes up the larger part of human history, is that there were very few material and noncorporeal media of information. Particularly, writing or the construction of monuments as
trans-generational transmitters of social memory were not yet in existence.
The phenomenon of ultra-sociality can lead to the formation of universals in largescale agricultural societies because the sheer size and complexity of such societies led to
specific needs and requirements. In order to be able to function, complex societies needed
complex institutions that transcend the organizational level of kinship relations (Richerson &
Boyd, 2001, pp. 201-203). Socioeconomically complex societies of large extension and
demographic density require the division of labor as well as subsystems, such as a
bureaucracy. Such societies have to adapt to the problems both of their own complexity and
that of their environment, which includes complex neighboring societies. Therefore, it is to be
expected that groups of people, no matter their specific cultures, are bound, as Parsons
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postulated, to exhibit similarities to a certain degree, depending not only upon the groups’
extension, size, and density of population but also upon their complexity (1964).
In this context, one can postulate the existence of a specific type of universals that can
be qualified as implicational universals, which are those that are closely linked with the
conditions of ultra-sociality and which are capable of widening the perspective of the small
“tribal” group to that of larger, more complex human societies. This would lead, specifically,
to a deeper understanding of universals that are the result of long-term social development. I
would like to elucidate this by means of a speculation on a typical theme of classical
sociology and anthropology, i.e., the nexus of kinship, altruism, and sexuality. In ultra-social
communities, the following scenario would be conceivable: altruism vis-à-vis relatives
(friends) as a bio-evolutionary universal may be stabilized by the cultural norm of kin
solidarity and thus functions as a – universal – bonding agent of culturally variable social
structures. The functional discharge and the elimination of kinship relations in the functional
subsystems that are being formed is an evolutionary universal on its way towards becoming a
modern and complex type of society. In the same process, the gratification of universal sexual
desires is freed from social constraints and expresses itself with less inhibition (Hejl &
Antweiler, 2004, p. 11). Through this speculation, it can be demonstrated that (1) universals
generally evolve in a systemic context and are thereby useful for the understanding of cultures
as social systems, that (2) biotic universals are capable of interacting with non-biotic ones,
and that (3) universals are not only of a static nature (such as “anthropological constants” in
philosophy) but may also emerge and disappear in history.
The search for universals may be called a search for the “human family.” Metaphors of
the human family are often normatively laden, such as in the famous exhibition Family of
Man, which Edward Steichen compiled in his capacity as curator of the Museum of Modern
Art in New York (Steichen, 1955). This exhibit was based on wishful thinking or
sentimentality, a hidden political agenda or crypto-religious ideas (Antweiler, 2012, pp. 65-68
for a compilation of the critique). What is easily forgotten is that the idea of humanity as a
family, despite being problematic, possesses a serious weakness. The metaphor of the family,
necessarily, cannot (and indeed must not) be understood in a Christian, Jewish or patriarchal
sense, nor should it be understood as consolatory or sentimental. The metaphor can also be
read in a historical or phylogenetic sense. The membership of each individual to the genres of
humankind is particularly emphasized by the concept of “family,” with its connotation of
kinship, connectedness, and unity. We are human beings because we are descended from
human beings. In that way, one could define humanity in terms of its genealogical
interrelatedness, and one could conceive of humanity as an extensional concept, which would
admit diversity (Böhme, 1999, p. 26).
Methods of an empirical search for universals: comparison between species and cultures
The most relevant method of empirically documenting universals includes conducting
multiple and diverse forms of comparison of different species, along with inter-cultural
comparison (Fig. 3) within species. A few other methods that have been of relevance for the
research of universals should be at least mentioned, and they include use of theories, case
histories, and archaeological methods. First, theories are important because universals are
sometimes deductively postulated. Second, case studies can be most instructive. They permit
the refutation of implicitly assumed universals or supposedly impossible phenomena (as
reflected in statements such as “in no culture are there any…”) by supplying evidence of
extreme varieties of human culture that contradict such generalizations. In this respect,
curious or odd phenomena prove their worth. The verification of one single well-documented
case of a marriage between women (gynaegamy), for example, is sufficient to upset
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Eurocentric notions of supposedly fully universal marital or family relations. A further
example would be the proof of the existence of a society in which women dominate the public
political sphere regularly. Archaeological methods become relevant when they are capable of
demonstrating the historical emergence of similar cultural features or patterns, independently
of each other. Thus there are to be found correspondences in the complex societies of the Old
and the New Worlds, especially with regard to their institutions. In a kind of historical
experiment, similar but independent structures can be shown to emerge from the same
Palaeolithic heritage.
One method, (not used by Brown), to do research into universals is to compare
humans and the higher primates. This poses the problem of what qualities all primates
actually have in common (ape universals). As such, some primatologists consider the
comparison across the entire range of apes to be of prime importance in order to be able to
understand the differences between, for example, chimpanzees and bonobos as well as the
similarities of both compared to other apes (Strier, 2001, p. 72; cf. Byrne, 2001, p. 170). Such
inter-species comparisons not only permit the establishment of homologies3 or phyletic4
connections but also the observation of additional analogies5 or convergences that are due to
similar environments or similar functional contexts. Therefore, contrary to common opinion,
comparisons between closely related species such as humans and non-human primates are
limited in generalizing about universals.
Cultures # 1, 2, 3 ...

…

... ca. 5000 – 6700

Present
universals (ethnographic present)

synchronic
comparisons

diachronic
comparisons

earlier (former) universals

Past

Figure 3: Synchronic and diachronic cultural comparison related universals (modified from
Antweiler, 2009)
In the social sciences, the fundamental method for supplying the empirical proof of the
existence of universals is the systematic use of worldwide, cross-cultural comparisons. The
synchronic comparisons of cultural anthropology can be supplemented with diachronic
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comparisons such as those supplied by historical research (Fig. 3) – something that has not
developed until recently. In comparative cultural research, a particular phenomenon is
observed across the range of numerous, or at least several, cultural units. Comparative
inquiries in the fields of cultural anthropology, sociology and political science can conduct
comparison on various levels including within one culture (i.e., intra-cultural comparison),
between various specific cultural units, such as ethnicities, societies, and nations (i.e., intercultural comparison), and between a larger number of societies, right up to world-wide
samples (i.e., systematic intercultural or holo-cultural comparison). Instead of dwelling more
extensively on the methodological problems one is confronted with in such empirical
comparisons of cultures (cf. Antweiler, 2016, pp. 206-233), I would like to highlight two
different general views of typological cultural comparison (Holenstein, 1985, p. 139): The
first view is that cultures are distinguished by means of features that they uniquely possess,
i.e. by distinctive features, or certain conditions, or even by their exclusive features. In this
view, cultures can be discontinuous with regard to each other. The second view is that
cultures are distinguished by means of the relative importance of features that are also to be
found elsewhere; thus, in this view, differences are gradual and at times, some invariant
factors can be demonstrated.
These two views have a strong influence on how cultural similarities or differences are
conceptualized, with the first view being the one that currently represents the mainstream
understanding in cultural and social studies. The second view is of a more optimistic bent,
though it might be caused by wishful thinking. In spite of this possibility, I hold the second
mode of comparison to be more adequate in theoretical terms and more realistically likely in
empirical terms.
The Causes of Universals: our biology … and much more!
When a phenomenon occurs in all or nearly all cultures, it is initially quite obvious to
consider attributing its existence to natural factors. This tendency is illustrated by the use of
terms such as “human nature” or “the human psyche.” In this context, one might ascribe
related causes to the structure and function of the human organism and assume the ultimate
cause to be rooted in the evolution of humankind. “The mental uniformity of humankind,” for
instance, can be held responsible for some or even a large number of universals, as Stephen
Pinker argues: “To see these deep parallels in the languages of French and the Germans, the
Arabs and the Israelis, the East and the West, people living in the age of the Internet and
people from the Stone Age, is to catch a glimpse of the psychic unity of humankind” (Pinker,
1999, p. 239).
The ubiquity of a trait or phenomenon, however, cannot automatically – as Pinker
implies – be ascribed to a biotic basis because in addition to biotic or evolutionary factors,
there are other possible causes of universals (Fig. 4). Global cultural phenomena can be
caused by the process of world-wide diffusion. Such diffusion occurred long before the
advent of globalization in our modern sense. Universals can also be due to historically early
forms of diffusion that were the result of the spread of Homo sapiens across the globe (the socalled process of “archoses”). Finally, universal types of behavior or of mental tendencies can
originate from the fact that human beings, as culturally dependent organisms, are confronted,
wherever they go, with similar circumstances and problems of ordering their lives. This
results in universal patterns among human communities without there being any specifically
genetic disposition for those patterns. The same applies to social universals that are a response
to universal functional requirements of societal organization (i.e., Parsons’ evolutionary
universals).
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1. Evolutionarily grown psychic or behavioral inclinations (e.g. nepotism)
2. Worldwide diffusion (e.g. use of fire for cooking)
3. Independent invention and cultural convergence because of functionality (e.g.
general moneys)
4. Organic effects of activity (e.g. trance in shamanistic seances; a near universal)
5. Physics (e.g. heavy heads of arrows, left/right directionality in traffic rules)
6. Necessary combinatorial effects (e.g. cliques in social networks)
Figure 4: Six possible causes of cultural universals (with examples)
Considering the essentially bio-cultural nature of humans, any study of universals is
generally faced with the theoretical as well as methodological problem of conflating culture
and biology. The capacity for culture in the form of non-genetic transmission represents a
biotic given that is necessary for human survival. Hence, there can be no empirical version of
humankind that would be “natural” in the sense of being entirely devoid of culture. The still
prevailing dichotomy of nature and nurture – whether it takes the form of an opposition, a
complement or an interaction – has proved to be one of the most serious obstacles in the
research on universals. Culture and nature as decisive factors must be seen separate from the
topic of similarities and differences. On principle, genes can be held responsible for
similarities as well as differences, just as much as culture can lead to similarities as well as
differences.
The strict dichotomy between a biotic substratum and a cultural “veneer,” in the
process of attributing universals to a non-variable biotic stratum and the more specific
features to a variable cultural layer is erroneous. Universals do not necessarily have to be
conditioned by genetics. The causes may be multiple and interwoven
Towards a realistic theory of culture: culture is more than difference
Reflecting upon and investigating universals may make a contribution to a realistic
concept of culture. In my view, the current theoretical debate regarding what constitutes
culture is dominated by somewhat extreme positions. On the one hand, cultural differences
are over-emphasized in a radically relativist manner. The current obsession with alterity is
opposed by an equally unhelpful tendency to obfuscate the borderlines between cultures. Both
approaches are found in concepts of hybrid cultures. This is not the place to discuss the
concept of culture at any great length, however. Instead, I shall give a brief sketch of my ideas
on culture as far as they are relevant within the topic of universals. For the sake of tying the
modern non-essentialist notion of culture to the theme of universals, of particular relevance
are the insights provided by linguists’ research on universals, as developed, for example, by
Elmar Holenstein in the context of cultural theory (Holenstein, 1985, 1998).
The currently dominant position among cultural anthropologists and some other
cultural studies – despite the differences between various approaches – is based on the idea
that cultures are not sharply delineated and not static and are neither homogenous nor
internally coherent. I share this critique that cultures are neither static nor monolithic, but I
also believe that in current cultural theory, the baby is often tossed out with the bathwater.
Cultures are definitely not “containers,” but on the other hand, they do not just amount to
mere clusters of elements, nor are they entities with totally open and unlimited contours. As
the research on ethnicity in inter-ethnic exchanges has shown, individual cultures are usually
kept strictly separate from the shared internal perspective (emic) of their members. From the
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external perspective of research (etic), however, and from outside the confines of cognitive –
emotional and identity factors, cultures are only rather imperfectly separated from one
another. In today’s view, cultures are not like Herder’s incommensurable “spheres” (Wiredu,
1995).
Cultures are internally diverse (intra-cultural diversity). Except for positive law, there is
hardly anything that one would find (a) only in one culture, (b) in all its members, and (c) in
no member of another culture. Cultures are not differentiated in such a way that culture A has
a number of features that are totally absent in culture B, with culture B being similarly
marked by an exclusive bundle of features. Rather, properties belonging to culture A are also
to be found (at least marginally) in (almost all) other cultures. Cultures, therefore, are not
differentiated on the basis of specific qualities or bundles of features that are their exclusive
property. Cultures differ instead via the status or degree of relevance given to certain features
in particular. Thus, it is the relative importance or hierarchical position of largely shared
qualities that causes cultures to differ. An insight like this is directly relevant for the
understanding of universals in general and important in methodological terms for the various
ways of conducting cultural comparison in particular: “…The assumption of discontinuous,
mutually exclusive types of culture has to be corrected by the insight into continually merging
types” (Holenstein, 1985, p. 104). Two cultures are “less different” by the presence or
absence of certain features than they are as a result of the differing weights given to almost
universally appearing features (Holenstein, 1985: 137-139).
The variations within one and the same culture (e.g. in terms of age, occupation, social
class, region, or epoch, referred to as “intercultural diversity”) are nearly as pronounced as the
ones between cultures, often even more so. Subcultures and non-conformity within cultures
are something normal; in addition, there are usually considerable inter-individual differences,
even if only on account of persons belonging to different age-groups. Holenstein goes so far
as to maintain that the differences within and between societies are identical with regard to
kind, degree, function, and consequence. The intra-cultural diversity within a culture is
analogous to the intercultural variability of humankind (Holenstein, 1985, p. 159). What this
amounts to is the abolition of the difference between intra- and intercultural difference, which
in my view is going a bit too far. However, it is worth considering that it is easier to
generalize about the human species, (i.e. to make statements that hold true for all human
beings and no other creatures) than it is to make general statements about some culture as a
specific population, (i.e. to make statements that apply to all the members of a culture, only to
that culture, and to members of no other culture (Holenstein, 1998, p. 326).
However, cultures are not – as mentioned above – just a “cluster” of elements that are
impervious to external influences. That is my objection to earlier versions of the concept of
trans-culturality as represented by Welsch (for a revised version, cf. Welsch, 2012). Even
though there are cultural manifestations that go right across the existing old container-type
models of culture, such as patterns of consumerism and occupational forms of behavior, this
does not cause cultures to be dissolved as units. People within different cultures maintain
relations with their surroundings and are dynamic, and yet in a limited fashion, these cultures
are integrated. Cultures are systematic organizations, but they are not uniform. Individual
subsystems are capable of acquiring a certain but limited degree of autonomy, like specialized
modules.
Universals are not capable of being understood without taking cultural diversity
seriously, just as cultural difference cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of
similarities (even so far as to postulate universals). This may be illustrated by drawing on an
example. In a study by López et al. (1997), the knowledge of mammals and their
categorization was made the object of a study comparing the Itza-Maya from Pètus
(Guatemala) and students from Michigan. On the one hand, there were some striking
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similarities concerning the classification of mammals by both groups, which, came very close
to demonstrating Carl von Linnaeus’ taxonomies. The inductive method used in order to
justify their choice was similar; thus, both groups used taxonomic assumptions. However,
there were significant differences with regard to the reasons given for the groups’ respective
categorizations. The Maya often relied on their ecological knowledge, while the American
students were mostly advancing taxonomic arguments. Are, therefore, such divergences
simply to be attributed to cultural difference, while the similarities point to the existence of
universals? This is clearly not the case because other studies have shown that causal logic is
dependent upon experience. Thus, the differences demonstrated between the two groups may
well be less culturally specific than purpose- and problem-specific. The taxonomies produced
by experts from different cultures resemble each much more closely than do those generated
by lay-people even though lay people also follow cultural models (Medin et al., 2002). This in
turn raises the question whether the similarities between group classifications might
themselves be regarded as universals.
Cosmopolitan humanism and universals
I would like to briefly elucidate some universals that may be made relevant for a
cosmopolitan humanism. I propose to do this by drawing on the example of worldviews and
the ideas of humanity underlying them. We have little systematic knowledge of ubiquitous
universalistic concepts of humanity within the great traditions of thinking. Much less do we
know about shared attributes among the thousands of cultures, societies, or ethnicities,
especially when it comes to common norms, values, or ideals. That is exactly the aim of this
essay. Worldviews (i.e. concepts of how the world is structured and works) show several
trans-cultural similarities. Thus, the cosmology of a uniform world and the cosmology based
on this are fairly widespread. What unites all these world concepts is their shared claim of
explaining how the world is ordered. Myths from all over the world that supply theories of
how the world came into existence and how it developed have a lot in common, even down
to the details.
In almost all societies, the following fundamental differences between human beings
and animals are made either explicitly or implicitly. Firstly, it is assumed that only humans
make fire not only to warm themselves but also for cooking; secondly, it is presumed that
humans only have sexual congress with other humans, and thirdly, it is observed that humans
alter their bodies by means of painting, mutilation, or clothing (Leach, 1982, p. 118). The
tendency to anthropomorphize and reify nature seems to be another universal (Kennedy,
1992). The same might apply to the dichotomization of nature and culture (Dissanayake,
1992, p. 72, Scharfstein, 2009). This has, however, not yet been verified empirically. As such,
some cultural anthropologists have strong doubts about whether the distinction of nature (as a
reality that exists independently from culture) is actually universal. Their argument is that
“nature” itself is a culture-specific category that denies its own cultural conditioning.
What universal ideas are held concerning the meso- and macro-worlds? On the basis
of comparative cultural research and deductive arguments, Michael Kearney has developed a
general model of worldviews (Kearney, 1984). Kearney’s generalizing “worldview
universals” (Kearney, 1984, pp. 65-107; 1996, p. 138) in many respects correspond to an
early model of universals developed by Robert Redfield (Redfield, 1953). According to both
models, the most fundamental and universal differentiation is the one between Self and Other.
Kearney emphasizes the logical connections that exist within this dichotomy. Accordingly, all
other dualistic differentiations are largely derived from this basic one. The concepts of time
and space are more closely dependent on the concept of causality than they are on each other.
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Aside from the similarities of worldviews, there are, among the many universals that
have been so far documented, quite a few which might be relevant for a project on humanism.
In Fig. 5 I have listed some of them.
-

Concept of human beings (e.g. as an organism and human qualities, e.g. the capacity
of suffering)
Concepts of mankind (currently only widely shared, a probably emerging universal)
Concepts of actors with limited autonomy (agency)
Concepts of history, the historicity of human culture, natural history
Cooperation
Reciprocity (behaviour and social norms)
A minimum of fairness in competition (at least as a tendency)
Capacity for empathy
Concepts, norms and ideals of education
The family as a combined sphere of biotic propagation and social reproduction
Concepts of adolescence and other age groups and rites of passage
Gender differences in behaviour during adolescence
Dichotomous gender-concepts, -norms and –ideals
Locally and empirically founded knowledge and performative learning
Thinking in metaphors
Nepotism-tendency
Egoism-tendency
Social control of deviant behaviour

Figure 5: Proposed universals relevant for an inclusive humanism: a selective list
(orig. Antweiler, 2015)
Conclusion: Universalizing vs. relativism and absolutism
Universals are not simply the counterpart to the diversity of human cultures.
Universals only acquire their real relevance when they are viewed as a common pattern
against the background of cultural diversity. Research into universals opens a fruitful addition
to perspectives on human nature. The use of an empirical approach to universals offers a
middle course between speculation and wishful thinking on the one hand and the
unsystematic gathering of lists of assumed similarities on the other. Anthropology is “…the
understanding of the humanly possible – and the limits of what is humanly possible”
(Hauschild, 2005, p. 61; Boghossian, 2006). Thus, the continuing research into universals is
capable of making a contribution to a human science and to an anthropology that is an
empirically oriented but at the same time a theoretically informed science of “the whole
human.”
Research into universals can grant important insights into the similarities between the
approximately 7000 cultures existing in this world. Universals are not to be mistaken for
absolutes. A frequent, more than accidental emergence of a phenomenon is sufficient in order
to raise the question of universality. However, universals derive their real interest by being
perceived against the background of cultural diversity. They cannot be verified by some kind
of “opinion poll.” What is called for in methodological terms is the formation of a theory on
the basis of evolutionary social sciences for the purpose of making judicious intercultural
comparison.
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Universals are not simply to be equated with the contitio humana or “anthropological
constraints,” such as they are discussed in philosophy. By the same measure, they are not to
be equated with “the physic unity of humankind.6” Universalism understood as an absolute is
just as untenable as a one-sided particularism that has mutated into relativism. In a dogmatic
universalism, cultural anthropology would be superfluous because the familiar and strange
would just be the facets of something identical. On the other hand, an extreme insistence on
cultural difference is a dead end. The obsession with alterity makes culture into an
unquestionable and reified given, and this can be politically dangerous (van der Walt, 2006, p.
237ff.). It tends to produce ethnographies of the exotic and is an obstacle for the development
of an inclusive cosmopolitan humanism.

Are specific ways of life
relevant for establishing an
inclusive humanism?

Are pan-cultural
commonalities
relevant for an
inclusive
humanism?

no

yes

no
Scientific Nihilism:
very limited possibilities
of human science and
humanist politics
Absolutism:
e.g. human nature,
anthropic constants,
psychic unity

yes
Radical
Relativism

Universalizing
Approach;
Cosmopolitanism

Figure 6: basic orientations of human sciences relevant for an inclusive humanism
(strongly modified after Adamopoulos & Lonner, 1993: 130, and Lonner, 2005: 16).
Universals are conceived here as offering empirical access to human life-ways and as
representing an alternative to current extremes, which are mainstream in the public and in
cultural studies alike. A careful and empirically grounded universalistic approach stands
against both relativism and absolutism. The first steps toward an inclusive humanism or
cosmopolitanism will have been made when the knowledge on cultural universals in the
context of diversity has been understood. When this knowledge is combined with our
knowledge of human nature and when this combination is developed in a political and longterm intercultural dialogue based on explicitly understood cross-cultural values, a valid
cosmopolitan inclusive humanism can be produced.
In order to once more underline the special status of this approach, Fig. 6 will give a
rough and ready overview of the position of universalism vis-à-vis absolutist and extremely
relativist positions. The two important issues here are the emphasis given to commonalities in
human experience and the weight given to cultural context. Similarities and specifics are of
equal importance. The main challenge posed by universalism lies in empirically verified
commonalities between cultures that have been shown by intercultural comparison.
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A current cosmopolitan humanism needs to know the whole latitude of humanistic
approaches. Culture is more than difference. There are empirically demonstrated pan-cultural
commonalities. As a remedy to current identity wars, let us not overstate culture. Let us take
more into account the lower and upper levels of human life: human beings and humanity.
Different peoples do not live in different worlds but differently in one world.
Notes

1

For a broader development of the arguments, see my book Inclusive Humanism. Anthropological basics for a
Realistic Cosmopolitanism (Antweiler, 2012); for the full argument concerning human universals and for
numerous examples, see a new book Our Common Denominator. Human Universals Revisited (Antweiler
forthcoming, 2016).
2
The Holocene is the geological epoch that began about 11,700 years BP (before the present) and continues until
the Anthropocene, a newly proposed epoch beginning with the industrial revolution in the late eighteenth
century.
3
Homologies are similarities among organisms based on common descent.
4
Phyletic refers to connections among organisms based on their evolutionary history.
5
Analogies are similarities among organisms due to convergent evolution and not based on common descent.
6
In 1860, Adolf Bastian had argued for “the psychic unity of mankind.” He proposed that a cross-cultural
comparison of all human societies would reveal that distinct worldviews consisted of the same basic elements.
He maintained that all human societies share a set of “elementary ideas” (Elementargedanken), but like Herder,
he held that the world consisted of many different cultures based on geographical locales and historical
circumstances that resulted in various “folk ideas” (Völkergedanken), which were local modifications of the
elementary ideas. This view has not been accepted in contemporary anthropology.
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